

## Information Circular

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# Communication dated 7 January 2016 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme

1. The Secretariat has received a communication dated 7 January 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, enclosing a "summary of Iran's comprehensive assessment" on the report of the Director General on "Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme" contained in document GOV/2015/68.
2. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the attachment to that communication is circulated herewith for information.





*Permanent Mission of*  
**ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**  
*to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*

**Summary of Iran's comprehensive assessment on the report entitled  
"Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding  
Iran's nuclear Programme"**

The IAEA Board of Governors by adopting the resolution GOV/2015/72, dated 15 December 2015, officially closed the consideration of the past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program.

Although the matter has already been closed, pursuant to the paragraph 9 of the "Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program" (Road-map, Doc. GOV/INF/2015/14), in order to officially put on record for the information of the Member States, Iran would like to state the following general observations:

1. Iran has stated time and again and in different levels that it has always been the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), not to engage in the acquisition, production, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear programme has always been and will remain for peaceful purposes. The Final Assessment, indeed, has not referred to Article XII.C which is a testimony to Iran's statement.

2. While Iran disagrees with some parts of the Final Assessment, several assessments of the report are in line with Iran's statement that:

- "The Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." (para 88 )

- "All the activities contained in the Road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule." "The implementation of the Road-map facilitated a more substantive engagement between the Agency and Iran." (para 86)

- "The Agency has not found indications of an undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in Iran, beyond those activities declared retrospectively by Iran." (para 77)

- "The Agency has found no indications of Iran having conducted activities which can be directly traced to the 'uranium metal document' or to design information for a nuclear explosive device from the clandestine nuclear supply network." (para 78)

- "The Agency acknowledges that there is a growing use of EBW detonators for civilian and conventional military purposes" (para 79) and "as previously reported by the Agency, such an application [EBW detonators for applications in the oil and gas industry in Iran] is not inconsistent with specialized industry practices." (para 39)

- "The Agency also notes the applicability of some hydrodynamic modelling to conventional military explosive devices." (para 81)



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- “The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” (para 85) [Although in our view, such assessment should be extended for all times.]
- “The Agency has assessed that the activities carried out at the [Gchine mine] site are consistent with Iran’s declarations provided in connection with the Framework for Cooperation and [Joint Plan of Action] JPA and that, in any event, no substantial amount of nuclear material could have been produced in the Gchine mine before 2006. The Agency assesses that the process design [of alleged studies documentation] for the production of uranium salts was technically flawed and of low quality in comparison to what was available to Iran as part of its declared nuclear fuel cycle.” (para 30) [This is one of the strong indications of the forgery of “the alleged studies documents”.]
- “The Agency re-evaluated this information in 2014 and assessed that the amount of natural uranium involved [at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory] was within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements”.(para 31)
- “The Agency has reassessed that this [alleged] experiment was ... not conducted in “the region of” Marivan”. (para 41)[Therefore, confirming Iran’s statement that there has never been any experiment in the region of Marivan.]
- “When the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited the main building of interest to the Agency at the Parchin site on 20 September 2015, they did not observe a chamber or any associated equipment inside the building”.(para 53)

In the meantime, Iran totally disagree with some parts of the report, including those paragraphs quoted from the Agency’s 2011 November report or a few assessments such as paragraphs 84 and 85, according to which it was claimed that “an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”, “conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003” and “these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies”.

We categorically reject existence of an alleged “organizational structure” relevant to possible military dimensions or any “coordinated effort” for some alleged activities before 2003 or any effort after 2003 relevant to it. If the mentioned activities are meant a few scientific studies on some dual-use technologies, it should be noted that in Iran, scientific studies of dual-use technologies have always been for peaceful civilian or conventional military uses. Moreover, scientific studies of dual-use technologies have never been prohibited under NPT. Regarding the allegations on Parchin in the report, Iran provided undeniable evidences which contested such allegations that had been leveled against activities in Parchin for long time.



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One should not lose sight of the fact that there was a coordinated effort and well-established organizational structure in foreign countries' agencies such as the project called as "Operation Merlin" for forging documents against Iran.

3. The fact that "the Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme" (para 88 of the report), clearly shows that Iran's nuclear programme has always been for peaceful purposes and was never diverted.

Although Iran cannot agree with some parts of the Final Assessment, in our view, tremendous work by experts from both Iran and the Agency should be appreciated. It is a fact that even in a certain scientific field, the experts have different opinions. During the negotiations of Road-map, we predicted such a possible situation and for that reason we agreed on paragraph 9 of Road-map.